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I. INTRODUCTION
The law with regard to judicial review of labor arbitration
awards' is in substantial disarray. Despite two Supreme Court
pronouncements on the limits of a court's power to review an ar-
bitrator's award, 2 the recent decisions of the courts of appeals
t Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. B.A., University
of Minnesota; J.D., Harvard Law School.
1. Labor arbitration is a means by which the parties to a collective bargain-
ing agreement-the employer and union-resolve disputes over the meaning
and terms of such agreement. It is a stage of dispute resolution that is reached
only after a number of preliminary steps have been taken to resolve the dispute.
The process begins with an employee filing a grievance with the employer. If
the dispute is not resolved, the union and employer discuss the matter verbally
or in writing in accordance with the various steps of the contractual grievance
procedure. If the dispute is not resolved by these means, as most are, the union
must then decide whether to process the grievance to the final step-arbitration.
If the union demands arbitration, most agreements require the parties to select a
neutral arbitrator and agree on a time and place for a hearing. If the matter is
not settled before the hearing, as many are, the parties proceed to a hearing,
which may involve legal representation and the production of a hearing tran-
script. While the format is admittedly adversarial, arbitration procedures are
less formal than those required in a court of law. The arbitrator determines his
or her resolution of the issues, most often through a written award and opinion.
Most collective bargaining agreements provide that such determination by the
arbitrator shall be "final and binding." For an overview of the labor arbitration
process, see F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (4th ed. 1985).
It is estimated that 96% of collective bargaining agreements provide for binding
arbitration of contract disputes. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND
CONTRACTS, (BNA) Vol. 2, § 51.5.
2. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United Rub-
ber Workers of America, 461 U.S. 757 (1982); United Steelworkers of America
(57)
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v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). In WR. Grace & Co., the
Court reaffirmed the standards set forth in Enterprise Wheel:
Under well-established standards for the review of labor arbitra-
tion awards, a federal court may not overrule an arbitrator's decision
simply because the court believes its own interpretation of the contract
would be the better one. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960). When the parties include an
arbitration clause in their collective-bargaining agreement, they choose
to have disputes concerning constructions of the contract resolved by
an arbitrator. Unless the arbitral decision does not "dra[w] its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement," id., at 597, a court is bound
to enforce the award and is not entitled to review the merits of the
contract dispute. This remains so even when the basis for the arbitra-
tor's decision may be ambiguous. Id. at 598.
461 U.S. at 764. In WR. Grace & Co., the court enforced the arbitrator's award
after determining that the collective bargaining agreement did not violate public
policy. 461 U.S. at 770. In this case, W.R. Grace & Co. ("company") faced pos-
sible liability for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for discrimi-
natory hiring of blacks and women. Id. at 759. The company signed an
agreement with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to conciliate
the dispute. Id. Pursuant to the conciliation agreement, the company laid off
several employees who asserted protection under the seniority provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement and filed grievances. Id. at 761. The company
refused to arbitrate the employees' grievances and sought an injunction barring
the arbitration of grievances that conflicted with the conciliation agreement. Id.
at 760. Two years after the district court granted the company summary judg-
ment, the court of appeals reversed. Id. at 761-62. The appellate court granted
the union's original counterclaim and compelled the company to arbitrate. Id. at
762. The arbitrator found that the collective-bargaining agreement did not pro-
vide a good-faith defense for the company's violations of the seniority provision
of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 765.
In W.R. Grace & Co., the Court also gave deference to the arbitrator's analy-
sis of the merits of the grievances. Id. Judge Blackmun wrote: "Although con-
ceivably we could reach a different result were we to interpret the contract
ourselves, we cannot say that the award does not draw its essence from the col-
lective bargaining agreement." Id. at 765-66 (footnote omitted). For an analysis
of W. R. Grace & Co., see Christensen, W R. Grace and Co.: An Epilogue to the Tril-
ogy?; ARBITRATION 1984: ABSENTEEISM, RECENT LAw, PANELS, AND PUBLISHED
DECISIONS, PROC. OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB.
21 (1985).
In Enterprise Wheel, a group of employees who left their jobs in protest
against one employee's discharge were also discharged. 363 U.S. at 595. When
the employees filed grievances and the employer refused to arbitrate, the union
brought a suit to enforce the arbitration provisions of the collective-bargaining
agreement. Id. After the district court ordered arbitration, the arbitrator found
that the discharge of the employees was not justified and required reinstatement
of the employees. Id. Disagreeing with the arbitrator's construction of the col-
lective-bargaining agreement, the court of appeals refused to enforce the em-
ployees' reinstatement. Id. at 598. The Supreme Court reversed and stated that
the question of interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement is a ques-
tion for the arbitrator. Id. at 599. The Court noted that even though the arbitra-
tor's opinion for the award was ambiguous, ambiguity is not a reason for
refusing to enforce an award. Id. at 598. The Court reasoned that requiring
opinions free of ambiguity may result in arbitrators not writing supporting opin-
ions, a scenario which is undesirable because a "well-reasoned opinion tends to
engender confidence in the integrity of the process and aids in clarifying the
underlying agreement." Id. The Court concluded that "[ilt is the arbitrator's
2
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vary greatly in approach. 3 Some, following the precepts of the
Supreme Court's decision in United Steelworkers of America v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp.4 give great weight to the factfinding and
analysis of labor arbitrators and rarely overturn an award.5
construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision con-
cerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him
because their interpretation of the contract is different from his." Id. at 599.
3. Compare Morgan Serv. v. Local 323, Chicago & Central States Joint Bd.,
724 F.2d 1217, 1222-24 (6th Cir. 1984) (overturning arbitrator's award of rein-
statement without back pay) and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Teamsters Local Union
No. 243, 683 F.2d 154, 156 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (intimating that to find
an implied condition, arbitrator must first find language of contract to be ambig-
uous), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983) with Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers
of America, 768 F.2d 180, 186 (7th Cir. 1985) (judicial review of arbitration
awards limited to determination of whether award "can be rationally derived
from some plausible theory of the general framework or intent of the agree-
ment"), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1184 (1986) and Drummond Coal Co. v. UMW
District 20, 748 F.2d 1495, 1498 (11th Cir. 1984) (award upheld because "at
least rationally inferable" from collective bargaining agreement and intent of
parties) (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Central Ga. Ry. Co., 415
F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1970)).
4. 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Enterprise Wheel is one of three Supreme Court deci-
sions comprising the Steelworkers Trilogy, in which the Court set forth the frame-
work for deciding questions concerning the relationship of federal courts to
arbitration proceedings. The other two cases making up the Steelworkers Trilogy
are: United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)
and United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960). For a discussion of the Court's reasoning in Enterprise Wheel, see
supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., New Meiji Market v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local
Union 905, 789 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986). In New Meiji, the employer fired an
employee for cash register discrepancies. Id. at 1334. After the union filed a
grievance and submitted the matter to arbitration, the arbitrator found the em-
ployer had violated the collective bargaining agreement by firing the employee
without good cause. Id. The arbitrator ordered reinstatement of the employee
and awarded back wages. Id. In the employer's suit to vacate the arbitrator's
award, the district court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment
and vacated the award. Id. at 1335. The union appealed this order to the Ninth
Circuit which reversed the lower court and ordered enforcement of the arbitra-
tion award. Id. at 1336. The appellate court reasoned that the question of inter-
pretation of a clause in the collective bargaining agreement was for the
arbitrator and, because the arbitrator's interpretation drew its essence from the
agreement, the court was required to give deference to the arbitrator. Id. Simi-
larly, the appellate court disagreed with the district court's finding that the arbi-
trator's award was ambiguous for failing to impose any discipline after the
determination that the employer imposed too severe discipline and that some
discipline was appropriate. Id. In addition, the court stated that even if a slight
ambiguity did exist, minor ambiguities are not a basis to deny enforcement of an
award. Id.; see also Shopmen's Local 539 of the Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers v.
Mosher Steel Co., 796 F.2d 1361, 1365 (11 th Cir. 1986) ("[Ilt is not the function
of the Court to second guess the arbitrator on matters that were within his
power to decide."); International Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, Local 261 v. Great
N. Paper Co., 765 F,2d 295, 296 (1st Cir. 1985) (courts are precluded from in-
terfering with arbitration awards for mere errors in assessing credibility of wit-
nesses); Abernathy v. United States Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 612, 618 (8th Cir.
1987]
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Others, also claiming to apply the standards of Enterprise Wheel,6
are more willing to second-guess arbitrators and more likely to
overturn an award.7
One subject on which these courts disagree, and the focus of
this article, is the applicability of the United States Arbitration
Act" ("Act") to suits seeking to vacate or enforce labor arbitration
awards. Enacted in 1925, the Act 9 contains specific standards
under which the award of an arbitrator can be vacated.10 Promul-
1984) (federal courts will not review merits of arbitration award); Office and
Professional Employees Int'l Union, Local 2 v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 724 F.2d 133, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (arbitral decision enforceable where
arbitrator did not demonstrate partiality, did not reach award contrary to public
policy and issued award sufficiently definite for enforcement).
6. For a discussion of Enterprise Wheel, see supra note 2.
7. See, e.g., HMC Management Corp. v. Carpenters Dist. Council of New
Orleans and Vicinity, 750 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1985). In HMC, the employer
fired two employees who had been placed on probation "for wasting time and
for performing substandard work." Id. at 1303. After the union filed grievances
on behalf of the discharged employees, HMC rehired one of them. Id. An arbi-
trator reviewed the case of the employee who had not been rehired and ordered
his reinstatement with backpay. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's finding that the arbitrator's award was not grounded in the bargaining
agreement and thus, unenforceable. Id. at 1304. The court found that the arbi-
trator failed to base his opinion on lack ofjust cause or denial of equal opportu-
nity, both valid reasons for reinstatement since provisions for each were in the
collective bargaining agreement. Id. The arbitrator stated that HMC acted im-
properly when it decided to retire one employee and not the others. Id. The
court viewed the arbitrator's decision as a dispensing of his own industrial jus-
tice, which is not enforceable. Id.; see also United Food & Commercial Workers
Union v. United Markets, Inc., 784 F.2d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1986) (arbitrator's
award vacated because resolution directly conflicted with language of agree-
ment); Johnston Boiler Co. v. Local Lodge No. 893, Int'l Bd. of Boilermakers,
753 F.2d 40, 44 (6th Cir. 1985) (court refused to uphold arbitration award
where it departed from clear and unambiguous meaning of collective bargaining
agreement).
8. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
9. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883. The Act became title 9 of the
United States Code. Title 9 was made positive law by section 1 of Act ofJuly 30,
1947, Pub. L. No. 80-282, 61 Stat. 669, which provided that "title 9 of the
United States Code, entitled 'Arbitration,' is codified and enacted into positive
law and may be cited as '9 U.S.C., § -'." Id. The United States Arbitration Act
is frequently referred to as the Federal Arbitration Act. See F. ELKOURI & E.
ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 26. For a discussion of the legislative history of the
Act, see infra notes 40-74 and accompanying text.
10. Section 10 of the Act provides:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for
the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating
the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration-
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitra-
tors, or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
4
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gated well before establishment of our current national labor pol-
icy, I however, the Act does not clearly state whether it is to apply
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the
agreement required the award to be made has not expired the court
may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)-(e) (1982).
11. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353
U.S. 448 (1957), and the three Supreme Court decisions comprising the Steel-
workers Trilogy, established the importance of labor arbitration in collective bar-
gaining agreements. In 1957, in Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court held that
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act authorized federal courts to
fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
grievance disputes. 353 U.S. at 451 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982)). For the
facts and a further discussion of Lincoln Mills, see infra note 17.
Subsequently in 1960, in the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court defined
the nature of the collective bargaining agreement and the role of the arbitrator
in relation to the collective bargaining process. In the first Trilogy case, United
Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), the Court
ruled that a court cannot weigh the merits of a grievance when parties have
agreed in a collective bargaining agreement to submit the grievance to an arbi-
trator. Id. at 567-68. In United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), the second case of the Trilogy, the Court framed
a rule of presumption of arbitrability in a collective bargaining agreement con-
taining an arbitration clause. Id. at 582-83. The Court noted: "An order to
arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpreta-
tion that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of
coverage." Id. (footnote omitted). Writing the opinion of the Court, Justice
Douglas recognized the significance of arbitration to a collective bargaining
agreement. Id. at 581. Justice Douglas noted:
Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a sys-
tem of private law for all the problems which may arise and to provide
for their solution in a way which will generally accord with the variant
needs and desires of the parties. The processing of disputes through
the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and
content are given to the collective bargaining agreement.
Id.
In the last Trilogy case, Enterprise Wheel, the Supreme Court defined the
scope of review of an arbitration award. Recognizing that the award must relate
to the collective bargaining agreement, the Court noted that the arbitrator's
award is "legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bar-
gaining agreement." Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597. Moreover, the Court
noted that a mere ambiguity in the arbitrator's opinion accompanying his award
is not a reason to refuse enforcement of the award. Id. at 598. The Court con-
cluded by indicating that parties bargain for the arbitrator's construction of the
contract; therefore, courts cannot overrule the arbitrator's decision because
their interpretation of the contract differs from the arbitrators. Id. at 599. For a
review of the Steelworkers Trilogy, see Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy: A Cele-
bration, DECISIONAL THINKING OF ARBITRATORS AND JUDGES, PROC. OF THE
THIRTY-THIRD ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. 331 (1980).
1987]
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to arbitrations arising under collective bargaining agreements.
Instead, section 112 of the Act provides only that "nothing herein
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, rail-
road employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce."' 3 Whether this language excludes col-
lective bargaining agreements as "contracts of employment of
• . . workers engaged in . . . interstate commerce"' 4 has been a
source of substantial disagreement.' 5 The legislative history has
not given a clear answer' 6 and the Supreme Court has not specifi-
cally addressed the issue. It has been argued, however, that the
Court implicitly rejected the availability of the Act to enforce arbi-
tration clauses in collective bargaining agreements by failing to
consider the issue in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills
of Alabama, 17 a case in which application of the Act had been ex-
In 1982 in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United
Rubber Workers of America, 461 U.S. 757 (1982), the Supreme Court affirmed
its holding in Enterprise Wheel. In considering whether an arbitration award
should be enforced, the Court stated that "a federal court may not overrule an
arbitrator's decision simply because the court believes its own interpretation of
the contract would be the better one." Id. at 764. Additionally, the Court noted
that as long as the arbitrator's decision draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement, "a court is bound to enforce an award and is not entitled
to review the merits of the contract dispute." Id. For the facts and further dis-
cussion of W.R. Grace, see supra note 2.
The standards of labor arbitration provided by the Supreme Court in the
Steelworkers Trilogy continue as the basis for lower court decisions in labor arbitra-
tion disputes. For further explanation of the arbitration process, see F. ELKOURI
& E. ELKOURI, supra note 1.
12. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 provides:
"Maritime transactions", as herein defined, means charter parties,
bills of lading of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, sup-
plies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or any other
matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of controversy, would
be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction; "commerce", as herein de-
fined, means commerce among the several States or with foreign na-
tions, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of
Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any
such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District
of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.
Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. For a discussion of the disparate views of circuits considering the appli-
cability of the Act to collective bargaining agreements, see infra notes 21-29 and
accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Act, see infra notes 40-
74 and accompanying text.
17. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). In Lincoln Mills, the union and employer entered
6
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tensively discussed by the court below.' 8
The issue was hotly debated by courts of appeals prior to the
decision of the Supreme Court in Lincoln Mills.' 9 In Lincoln Mills,
the Court held that collective bargaining agreements, including
arbitration clauses, are enforceable under section 301 of the La-
into an agreement that provided there would not be strikes or work stoppages.
Id. at 449. Any employee filing a grievance had to follow a specific procedure in
which the last step was arbitration. Id. Several grievances were filed and
processed until they reached the arbitration step when the employer refused the
union's request for arbitration. Id. The union brought suit against the employer
to compel arbitration. Id. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction
and ordered the employer to comply with the arbitration. Id. The court of ap-
peals reversed and held that the district court had jurisdiction to entertain the
suit but had no authority to grant relief. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals and held that in applying section 301 (a) of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act the district court properly decreed specific performance of
the agreement to arbitrate the grievance. Id. at 456-69.
The Court determined that section 301(a) of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the en-
forcement of. . . collective bargaining agreements." 353 U.S. at 451. Because
section 301(b) provides a procedural remedy lacking at common law, section
301 serves as the source of substantive and procedural law for labor arbitration.
Id. Prior to Lincoln Mills, one view was that section 301(a) was not a source of
substantive law, but merely gave federal courts jurisdiction over labor controver-
sies in industries affecting commerce. Id. at 450. To support its decision that
section 301(a) serves as a source of substantive law, the Court stated:
Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro
quo for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the legislation
does more than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor or-
ganizations. It expresses a federal policy that federal courts should en-
force these agreements and that industrial peace can be best obtained
only in that way.
Id. at 455. For the text of section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,
see infra note 37.
In the majority opinion of Lincoln Mills, Justice Douglas did not discuss the
United States Arbitration Act although the Court had an opportunity to rule on
its applicability to collective bargaining agreements. In his dissent, Justice
Frankfurter noted this implicit rejection of the availability of the Act in enforcing
arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 466 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
18. Lincoln Mills of Alabama v. Textile Workers Union of America, 230
F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The court of appeals re-
viewed decisions from other circuits addressing the issue of whether the Act au-
thorizes enforcement of an arbitration agreement. 230 F.2d at 85-86. The
Fourth Circuit concluded that the provision excluding from the Act all contracts
of employment of workers engaged in interstate commerce applied to the entire
Act, and not to any particular section. Id. at 86. The Fifth Circuit in Lincoln Mills
then chose to follow the Fourth Circuit and held that the collective bargaining
agreement was a contract of employment and was therefore excluded from the
Act. Id.
19. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n v. Pennsylvania
Greyhound Lines, 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1951).
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bor Management Relations Act. 20 While the issue is less often
debated now, the courts of appeals still substantially disagree on
whether the Act applies to cases involving labor arbitration. A
substantial number of circuits, including the First, 21 Second, 22
Sixth 23 and Seventh 24 have, in recent years, applied the Act to
20. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Lincoln Mills, see
supra note 17.
21. See Hoteles Condado Beach v. Union De Tronquistas Local 901, 763
F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1985). In Hoteles Condado Beach, the union filed a grievance on
behalf of a discharged employee who was covered by a collective bargaining
agreement between the hotel company and the union. Id. at 36. After an arbi-
tration hearing, the arbitrator found that the company dismissed the employee
unjustifiably and ordered it to reinstate him. Id. at 37. As a result, the company
brought suit to vacate the arbitration award. Id. The court of appeals affirmed
the district court's granting of summary judgment to the company and vacating
of the arbitration award. Id. at 37-38. The court of appeals explained that under
section 10(c) of the United States Arbitration Act, an award may be vacated if the
arbitrator refuses to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy. Id.
at 38. The arbitrator in Hoteles Condado Beach refused to give any weight to a trial
transcript that was relevant in determining whether the employee violated the
company's disciplinary regulations. Id. at 40. Under section 10(d) of the Act a
court may vacate an award where the arbitrator exceeds his power. Id. at 38. An
additional reason for the court's vacating the arbitrator's award was that the ar-
bitrator improperly interpreted and disregarded the plain language of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. Id. at 41. See also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Local 8-766,
Oil Workers Int'l Union, 600 F.2d 322 (1st Cir. 1979) (court considered vacating
arbitration award under section 10 of Act).
22. See Bell Aerospace Co. v. Local 516, Int'l Union, United Auto. Workers
of America, 500 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1974). In Bell, one of two unions in an em-
ployer's plant filed a grievance claiming that jobs belonging to members of its
union had been improperly assigned to members of the other union. Id. at 922.
The grievance was heard by an arbitrator who issued an award that one union
and the employer claimed was imperfectly executed. Id. The district court or-
dered the arbitrator to clarify the award and subsequently confirmed the award
as clarified. Id. On appeal by one union and the employer, the court of appeals
held that the award was ambiguous and remanded the case for another arbitra-
tion award. Id. at 924-25. The court relied on section 10(d) of the Arbitration
Act that states an award may be vacated where the arbitrator " 'so imperfectly
executed [his powers] that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.' " Id. at 923 (quoting United States Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1982)).
23. See National Post Office Mailhandlers v. United States Postal Serv., 751
F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1985). In National Post Office, the union representing postal
workers filed two grievances on behalf of a postal employee who had been ar-
rested for trafficking in marijuana and thus discharged from his job. Id. at 836.
Because the charges against the employee were dropped, the arbitrator ordered
that the employee be reinstated. Id. at 837. However, the Postal Service would
not permit his return after a grand jury indicted him for drug trafficking. Id.
The union filed a second grievance that resulted in a second arbitrator sus-
taining the discharge because he believed the employee had pleaded guilty to
the charge of drug trafficking on the day of the indictment. Id. at 838. However,
the employee had not pled guilty until four weeks after his discharge had be-
come final. Id. The court of appeals applied section 11 of the Act, which per-
mits a court to modify and correct an award to effect the intent of and promote
justice between the parties. Id. at 840. Although the arbitrator mistakenly be-
[Vol. 32: p. 57
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suits involving the arbitration of collective bargaining disputes.
The Fourth Circuit 25 has specifically rejected application of the
Act to such arbitration and a number of others have either issued
somewhat conflicting opinions, 26 specifically reserved the ques-
lieved that the employee's plea of guilty preceded his discharge, the court
viewed the discharge to have been improper for only the 31 days between the
time of discharge and the guilty plea. Id. at 844. Thus, the court modified the
award and ordered that the employee receive back pay for the 31-day period.
Id.; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Plant Protection Ass'n Nat'l, 770 F.2d 69, 74 (6th
Cir. 1985) (Arbitration Act has emphasized limited role of judiciary); Detroit
Coil Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 82, 594 F.2d 575, 577 (6th
Cir. 1979) (arbitrator exceeded scope of his authority), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840;
Chattanooga Mailers Union v. Chattanooga News - Free Press Co., 524 F.2d
1305, 1315 (6th Cir. 1975) (district court was correct in looking to Act to pro-
vide method for choosing disinterested arbitrator).
24. See Pietro Scalzitti Co. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Lo-
cal No. 150, 351 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1965). In Pietro Scalzitti, a construction com-
pany brought an action against the engineers' union for violating a no-strike
clause in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 577. The union demanded
arbitration of the complaint. Id. at 578. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's order of a stay of the proceedings pending arbitration of the issue.
Id. at 580. Although the company asserted that the collective bargaining agree-
ment is a contract of employment excluded by section 1 of the Act, the court of
appeals held that the exclusion related only to workers engaged in transporta-
tion involving interstate or foreign commerce. Id. Thus, the collective bargain-
ing agreement was not within the exclusion and the Act was applicable to permit
the court to require arbitration of the dispute. Id.; see also Milwaukee Typo-
graphical Union No. 23 v. Newspapers, 639 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir. 1981) ("This
court has held that the Act's exclusion relates only to workers in transportation
industries.").
25. See Sine v. Local No. 992 Int'l Bd. of Teamsters, 644 F.2d 997 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981). In Sine, two employees brought suit seek-
ing to vacate an arbitration decision denying them back pay from their employer,
an interstate carrier. Id. at 998. Although the employees asserted that the Act
was applicable, the court of appeals concluded that the Act excluded contracts of
employment of workers engaged in interstate commerce under section I of the
Act. Id. at 1002; see also United Elec. Workers of America v. Miller Metal Prod.,
215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954) (court would not use distinction between col-
lective bargaining agreements and contracts of employment to enforce agree-
ment under Act). But cf. International Chem. Workers Union Local No. 566 v.
Mobay Chem. Corp., 755 F.2d 1107 (4th Cir. 1985) (discussed parties' allega-
tions under Act without approving or rejecting applicability of Act).
26. Compare Newark Stereotypers' Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger
Co., 397 F.2d 594 (3d Cir.) (applying Act), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954 (1968) with
Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1127 (3d Cir. 1969) (deny-
ing applicability).
In Newark Stereotypers' Union, as required by a collective bargaining agree-
ment, an arbitration panel resolved a dispute between the company and the
union about the number of employees required to operate a new machine. Id. at
596. The union sought vacation of the award under section 10 of the Act claim-
ing that the arbitration panel intimidated the union's expert witness which re-
sulted in his not testifying before the panel. Id. The court of appeals applied
section 10 of the Act to conclude that the union received a fair hearing before
the arbitration panel and that the award should be confirmed. Id. at 600.
Compare also Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union #420 v. Kinney
1987]
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tion, 27 or referred to the Act without specifically adopting it.28
Further confusing the issue, a number of circuits which purport to
apply the Act to labor arbitration awards have issued decisions in
which the Act is not even mentioned. 29
The issue is important because it affects the standards under
which labor arbitration awards are reviewed. Confusion over the
standards under which awards are to be reviewed leads to appeals
Air Conditioning Co., 756 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying Act) with Kemner
v. District Council of Painting & Allied Trades No. 36, 768 F.2d 1115, 1119 n.l
(9th Cir. 1985) (Act not applicable to collective bargaining agreement with con-
tractor because Act excludes contracts of employment of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce) and San Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters v. Cory, 685 F.2d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting application
of Act to collective bargaining agreement).
27. See, e.g., General Warehousemen & Helpers Local 767 v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 579 F.2d 1282, 1294-95 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. dismissed,
441 U.S. 957 (1979). In Standard Brands, the Teamsters brought suit to enforce
an arbitration award that was a remedy for the employer's breach of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 579 F.2d at 1284. The court of appeals affirmed the
district court's decision not to enforce the award as rendered and remanded the
case for further proceedings. Id. at 1296. The court noted that it could reach
the same result under the United States Arbitration Act but chose to rely on
federal common law. Id. at 1294-95 n.9. In the extensive footnote, the court
discussed other circuits that have applied the Act to collective bargaining agree-
ments. Id.
28. See, e.g., Grahams Serv. v. Teamsters Local 975, 700 F.2d 420 (8th Cir.
1982). In Grahams Service, the company asserted that the arbitrator's award
should be vacated under section 10(c) of the Act. Id. at 422. Although the court
discussed the Third Circuit's interpretation of section 10(c), the court relied on
Judge Learned Hand's analysis in American Almond Products Co. v. Consoli-
dated Pecan Sales, 144 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1944), to decide that, based on the
nature and purpose of arbitration, the court would not vacate the award. Id. at
423. In his brief concurring opinion, Judge Gibson stated: "I would make clear
that the Court is not squarely deciding the issue of whether the United States
Arbitration Act applies to the review of labor arbitration awards, an issue on
which courts are presently divided." Id. at 424; see also United Elec. Workers of
America v. Litton Microwave Cooking Products, 704 F.2d 393, 395-96 n.2 (8th
Cir. 1983) (Eighth Circuit has not squarely decided whether Act applies to col-
lective bargaining agreement), rev'd on rehearing, 728 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1984);
Note,Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: Refining the Standard of Review, 11
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 993 (1985) (court may apply section 10 review standard
without adopting entire Arbitration Act).
29. While this situation is most likely due to the moving party's failure to
include the Arbitration Act in its complaint, the omission can cause confusion
for those attempting to determine the status of the law. See, e.g., Local 1445,
United Food Workers Int'l Union v. Stop & Shop Companies, 776 F.2d 19 (1st
Cir. 1985) (applying common law to affirm arbitration award without consider-
ing applicability of Act); United Steelworkers of America v. Adbill Management
Corp., 754 F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 1985) (affirming arbitration award without relying
on Act);Johnston Boiler Co. v. Local Lodge 893, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 753
F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1985) (overturning arbitration award without mentioning Act);
Jones Dairy Farm v. Local P-1236, United Food Workers Int'l Union, 755 F.2d
583 (7th Cir. 1985) (same), vacated, 760 F.2d 173 (7th Cir.) (arbitrator's award
enforced).
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which are not well-founded. Such appeals lead to delay and, most
importantly, this delay undercuts the entire labor arbitration pro-
cess by threatening both the finality of the process and the posi-
tive labor relations benefits of a final decision.
While the primary focus of this article is judicial review of
arbitration awards, the issue of whether the Act applies to labor
arbitration may also be important in determining whether an arbi-
trator has authority to issue a subpoena, 30 whether venue orjuris-
diction are proper3' and the appropriate statute of limitations. 32
This article takes the position that the Act3 3 does not and
should not apply to arbitration arising under a collective bargain-
ing agreement. While the legislative history is not extensive, a
review of the concerns of Congress at the time the Act was passed
reveals that it was directed at commercial arbitration and the
30. Section 7 of the Act permits an arbitrator to summon witnesses in the
same manner as a subpoena provides. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1982). Section 7 provides
in pertinent part:
The arbitrators selected either as prescribed in this title or other-
wise, or a majority of them, may summon in writing any person to at-
tend before them or any of them as a witness and in a proper case to
bring with him or them any book, record, document, or paper which
may be deemed material as evidence in the case.
Id.
In states lacking statutes that give arbitrators subpoena authority, applica-
bility of the Act can be important. See Emerson, Reluctant Witnesses in Discharge
and Discipline Arbitration, 11 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L. J. 716, 718 (Spring 1986)
(although Act grants arbitrators right to subpoena witnesses, applicability of Act
to collective bargaining arbitration not yet resolved); Heinsz, Lowry & Torzew-
ski, The Subpoena Power of Labor Arbitrators, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 29, 45 (1979) (Act
provides precarious base for exercising arbitral subpoena power; however, arbi-
trators have implied power to subpoena witnesses under section 301 of Labor
Management Relations Act).
31. See, e.g., Central Valley Typographical Union, No. 46 v. McClatchy
Newspapers, 762 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1985). In McClatchy, the Ninth Circuit ruled
on the issue of what is proper venue under section 10 of the Act. Id. at 744.
Section 10 provides that "the United States court in and for the district wherein
the award was made may make an order vacating the award. ... 9 U.S.C. § 10
(1982). Although McClatchy asserted that the arbitration award was "made"
where the arbitrator lived and where the award was written, mailed and served,
the court held that an award is "made" where the arbitration hearing is held.
762 F.2d at 744.
32. See, e.g., San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters v. Cory, 685
F.2d 1137, 1140 n.5, (9th Cir. 1982). The court noted that Congress did not
enact a statute of limitations for section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act. Id. at 1139. However, observed the court, in actions to vacate arbitration
awards, courts have applied the three-month limitations period of the United
States Arbitration Act as well as the limitations period of the relevant forum
state statute. Id. at 1140 n.5. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
uniform use of the Act's limitation period should not be applied when it is un-
clear whether the Act applies to collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 1142.
33. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
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needs of merchants and traders.3 4 While a number of circuits
have held the Act to apply to labor arbitration,3 5 the early deci-
sions of these courts were based, at least in part, on the courts'
perception that national labor policy required that a forum be
available to resolve disputes involving collective bargaining
agreements.3 6 Such a forum has now been provided by section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,37 as interpreted by
the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers Trilogy.38 Thus, there is no
longer a need to stretch statutory interpretation to provide a
forum.
Finally, the Act provides an all too detailed blueprint for the
34. For a discussion of the legislative history demonstrating that the Act
was directed at commercial arbitration and the needs of merchants and traders,
see infra notes 51-62 & 231-32 and accompanying text.
35. For a discussion of those circuits that have held the Act to apply to
labor arbitration, see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
36. For a discussion of those courts' perception that national labor policy
requires such a forum, see infra notes 86-135 and accompanying text.
37. 29 U.S.C § 185 (1982). Section 185 provides:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations,
may be brought in any district court of the United States having juris-
diction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose
activities affect commerce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by
the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be sued
as an entity and on behalf of the employees whom it represents in the
courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor or-
ganization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable
only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and
shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
(c) For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against labor
organizations in the district courts of the United States, district courts
shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the
district in which such organization maintains its principal office, or
(2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are
engaged in representing or acting for employee members.
(d) The service of summons, subpoena, or other legal process of any
court of the United States upon an officer or agent of a labor organiza-
tion, in his capacity as such, shall constitute service upon the labor
organization.
(e) For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any per-
son is acting as an "agent" of another person so as to make such other
person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts
performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not
be controlling.
Id.
38. For a definition and discussion of the Steelworkers Trilogy, see supra notes
2, 4 & 11 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 32: p. 57
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challenge of arbitration awards in court. The attributes of labor
arbitration are speed, flexibility, informality and finality. Con-
tracts are often drafted by non-lawyers and the continuing bar-
gaining relationship of the parties is harmed when a dispute is not
finally settled by arbitration but, rather, is continued in the
courts.39 By contrast, commercial arbitration, for which the Act
was most likely designed, 40 involves more carefully drafted con-
tracts and fewer continuing long-term relationships.
The sections which follow examine the legislative history of
the Act, with emphasis on the exclusion for contracts of employ-
ment, the early judicial decisions interpreting the exclusion and
those current decisions which have applied the Act to review of
labor arbitration awards. The final section discusses the premise
of this article that the Act should not apply to review of labor
arbitration awards.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The legislative history of the Act reveals that the primary fo-
cus of Congress was on remedying the problems of commercial
arbitration and that little time or discussion was spent on the ulti-
mate exclusion for contracts of employment. The Act originated
in the Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law of
the American Bar Association, and a draft of the bill was submit-
ted at the Association's meeting in 1921. 4 1 In 1922, the Associa-
tion adopted the recommendations of the Committee. 42 The
federal arbitration bill, in the form adopted by the American Bar
Association, was then, in December, 1922, introduced in the Sen-
39. For a discussion arguing that the continuing bargaining relationship of
the parties is harmed when a dispute is not settled by arbitration, see infra notes
236-38 and accompanying text.
40. For a discussion of the application of the Act to commercial arbitration,
see infra notes 51-62 & 231-32 and accompanying text.
41. The United States Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153
(1925) [hereinafter Arbitration Law]. For a review of the Act's legislative history,
with focus on the exclusion for contracts of employment, see Burstein, The
United States Arbitration Act - A Reevaluation, 3 VILL. L. REV. 125, 129-34 (1958). It
is not uncommon for the A.B.A. and similar organizations to assume a quasi-
legislative function and to draft model legislation for submission to Congress or
state legislatures. See, e.g., Arbitration Law, supra, at 156 (noting A.B.A. considera-
tion of model state arbitration statute).
42. Arbitration Law, supra note 41, at 153. The Association adopted the re-
vised draft of the bill for a uniform state arbitration law, a revised draft of a
Federal Arbitration statute, and a revised draft of a treaty for commercial arbi-
tration. Id. In adopting these measures, the Association also passed thirteen
resolutions, one of which referred to the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, the bill regarding a uniform state arbitration law. Id.
1987]
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ate by Senator Thomas Sterling and in the House by Congress-
man Wilbur Mills. 4 3 The bill was not, however, reported out by
the committees to which it was referred. 44
In December, 1923, the federal arbitration bills were reintro-
duced in both houses of Congress. 45 On January 29, 1924, the
subcommittees of the Senate and House Committees on the Judi-
ciary held a joint hearing on the bills. 46 Both committees re-
ported favorably on their respective bills, 4 7 and a bill was passed
in the House on June 6, 1924,48 and in the Senate, with amend-
ments, on January 31, 1925. 4 9 On February 12, 1925, President
Calvin Coolidge signed the bill.5 0
The Senate Committee on theJudiciary, in its May 14, 1924,
report, spoke specifically to the need for enforcement of commer-
cial arbitration provisions in contracts. 51 In describing the histor-
ical anomalies that led to the then current non-enforcement of
arbitration provisions, the Committee Report states:
But it is very old law that the performance of a writ-
ten agreement to arbitrate would not be enforced in eq-
uity, and that if an action at law were brought on the
contract containing the agreement to arbitrate, such
agreement could not be pleaded in bar of the action; nor
would such an agreement be ground for a stay of pro-
ceedings until arbitration was had. Further, the agree-
ment was subject to revocation by either of the parties at
43. Id. See S. 4214, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1922); H.R. 13522, 67th Cong.,
4th Sess. (1922).
44. Arbitration Law, supra note 41, at 153. After a congressional committee
votes favorably on a bill, the legislation is "reported out" of the committee. C.
ZINN, How OUR LAws ARE MADE 18 (1974). The legislation is reported out by a
committee member, who is designated to write the committee report. Id. The
report generally describes the purpose and scope of the bill and the reasons for
its recommended approval. Id. In this instance, the bills were not reported out
of committee because of the lateness of the session and the pressure of other
important business. Arbitration Law, supra note 41, at 153.
45. Arbitration Law, supra note 41, at 153; see also H.R. 646, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1924).
46. Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S.
1005 and H.R. 646, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924) [hereinafterJoint Hearings].
47. S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924); H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). The House bill was reported out onJanuary 24, 1924,
and the Senate bill on May 14, 1924. Id.
48. 65 CONG. REc. 11,080-82 (1924).
49. 66 CONG. REC. 2759-62 (1925) (citations omitted).
50. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of February 12, 1925,
ch. 213, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883-86).
51. S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
[Vol. 32: p. 57
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any time before the award. With this as the state of the
law, such agreements were in large part ineffectual, and
the party aggrieved by the refusal of the other party to
carry out the arbitration agreement was without ade-
quate remedy. 52
The Report speaks of the need to make arbitration agreements
enforceable, noting that the "settlement of disputes by arbitration
appeals to big business and little business alike, to corporate in-
terests as well as to individuals. ' 53
The January 29, 1924, hearing, held by the Joint Committee
of Subcommittees on the Judiciary of the House and Senate, pro-
vides some insight into the concerns which Congress attempted
to address. Senator John Kendrick of Wyoming endorsed the bill
because it was favored by "business men of my section of the
West." 54 Charles Bernheimer represented the New York State
Chamber of Commerce, the Importers and Exporters Association
and the Merchants Association of New York.5 5 He spoke of the
difficulties of merchants and the expense of litigation to
merchants and society, mentioning lawyer fees in litigation as "an
economic wastage in the everyday commercial transactions. ' 5 6
An extensive brief on the statute was introduced by W.W.
Nichols, president of the American Manufacturers Export Associ-
ation of New York. It provided in part: "An agreement for arbi-
tration is in its essence a business contract. It differs in no
essential form from other commercial agreements. It should
stand upon the same plane and be regarded by the law in the
same light." 57 Nichols' brief further stated: "In what respect
does an arbitration agreement differ from any other commercial
contract, and, if such agreements ought to be enforced, why
should not the national power be exerted in their
support .. "58
When the bill reached the floor of Congress its commercial
orientation became even more clear. In the House, Representa-
52. Id. at 2.
53. Id. at 3. The House Report contains similar sentiments, stating that
"[a]rbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the
bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to his agreement." H.R. REP.
No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 5088 at 1 (1924).
54. Joint Hearings, supra note 46, at 5.
55. Id. at 6.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 40.
1987]
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tive Wilbur Mills spoke in response to an objection to considera-
tion of the bill on the consent calendar. 59 Noted Mr. Mills: "This
bill provides that where there are commercial contracts and there
is disagreement under the contract, the court can force an arbitra-
tion agreement in the same way as other portions of the con-
tract."'60  The objection was withdrawn and the bill was
reported 6' and passed. 62
The legislative history of the Act does not clearly speak to the
reasons behind the exclusion for "contracts of employment" con-
tained in Section 1,63 an exclusion which was not in the original
bill but was included in the bill introduced in December, 1923.64
For this reason, it has been necessary for commentators and
courts to look behind the Congressional debates and committee
reports. What has been discovered is that some representatives
of organized labor opposed the bill as originally drafted.
In late 1922, when the original bill was introduced in the
Senate and House, the president of the International Seamen's
Union of America, Andrew Furuseth, charged that the bill as then
drafted constituted a "compulsory labor" bill. 65 Similarly, the
American Federation of Labor protested against the bill and later
claimed that its intervention and protest caused Congress to
adopt the exclusionary provisions of Section 1, which the Federa-
tion reported "exempts labor from the provisions of the law." 66
Further, hearings on the proposed bill contained assurances
from a spokesman for the American Bar Association that the bill
59. 65 CONG. REC. 11,080 (1924). Each day Congress is in session, it prints
a calendar for the House representatives, together with a history of all measures
reported by a standing committee of either house. C. ZINN., How OUR LAWS
ARE MADE 21 (1974). As soon as a bill is favorably reported it is assigned a
calendar number on one of two principal calendars of business, the Union Cal-
endar and the House Calendar. Id. If a measure pending on either of these
calendars is of a noncontroversial nature, it may be placed on the consent calen-
dar. Id. If objection is not made to the placement of a bill on the calendar and if
the bill is not "passed over" by request, it is passed by unanimous consent with-
out debate. Id. at 21-22.
60. 65 CONG. REC. 11,080 (1924) (statement of Rep. Mills).
61. Id. at 11,081.
62. Id. at 11,082.
63. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Reports by the congressional committees are
silent as to the reason for this exclusion. Sturges & Murphy, Some Confusing Mat-
ters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 580, 605 (1952). For the text of section 1, see supra note 12.
64. Burstein, supra note 41, at 130 (citingJoint Hearings, supra note 46).
65. See Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Convention of the International
Seamen's Union of America 203 (1923).
66. Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual Convention of the American Federation of
Labor 52 (1925).
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was not "to make an industrial arbitration in any sense" 67 and
Senator Thomas Sterling, chairman of the subcommittee, ac-
knowledged that the purpose of an amendment similar to the ex-
clusion of Section 1 was to limit the law to commercial
arbitration. 6
Other support also exists for the claim that labor's com-
plaints led to amendment of the proposed statute. 69 A January
21, 1923 letter from then Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoo-
ver to Senator Sterling contains the following passage: "If objec-
tion appears to the inclusion of workers' contracts in the law's
scheme, it might be well amended by stating 'but nothing herein
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, rail-
road employees, or any other class of workers engaged in inter-
state or foreign commerce.' -70 This letter was submitted for the
record to the Joint Committee 7' which, in 1924, considered the
bill ultimately enacted, including the Section 1 exclusions, which
otherwise went unmentioned in the Committee hearings. 72
The 1924 Committee Reports also reveal that no representa-
tives of organized labor appeared before the Committee. 73 Thus,
one can assume that the needs and concerns of labor were be-
lieved met by Section l's exclusion for contracts of
employment.74
67. Hearing Before A Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 4213 and
S. 4214, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9 (1923). The A.B.A. spokesman suggested lan-
guage quite similar to that of the exclusionary clause in section 1 of the Act. Id.
68. Id. at 10.
69. See generally Burstein, supra note 41, at 130-31 (noting that testimony at
hearings and floor debate indicates "persuasively" that bill was intended to ap-
ply to commercial arbitration only and that absence of labor representatives
from hearings supports this conclusion).
70. Joint Hearings, supra note 46, at 21.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 1. The 1924 Committee Reports further illustrate the lack of
extensive consideration of the section 1 exclusions during the committee hear-
ings. See S. REP. No. 536, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924); H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5088 (1924). Neither report focuses on the exclusion issue.
73. See Burstein, supra note 41, at 130 (noting absence of labor representa-
tives at hearings).
74. See S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924); H.R. REP. No. 96,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 5088 (1924). The House Report notes that the legislation
was drafted by a committee of the American Bar Association and was sponsored
by that association and by a large number of trade bodies whose representatives
appeared before the committee on the hearing. Id. Significantly, there was no
opposition to the bill before the House Committee. Id.
1987]
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III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
While the Supreme Court has not discussed the applicability
of the Act to arbitration arising under a collective bargaining
agreement, its failure to discuss the issue in Lincoln Mills 75 caused
Justice Frankfurter to argue in dissent that the majority had, by
implication, rejected application of the Act to arbitration under
collective bargaining agreements.7 6
The Court's failure to discuss the Act in Lincoln Mills is partic-
ularly puzzling in light of the detailed discussion of the subject in
the opinion of the court below.77 In its Lincoln Mills opinion, 78
the Fifth Circuit carefully reviewed the state of the law on the is-
sue before deciding that a collective bargaining agreement is "a
contract of employment" within the meaning of the Act and, as
such, is excluded from the Act under Section 1.79
It is to the courts of appeals decisions of the 1950's, of which
Lincoln Mills is an example, that one must look for the most de-
tailed analysis of the issue. Before the Steelworker's Trilogy8 0 and
the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Lincoln Mills8 ' that arbi-
tration clauses of collective bargaining agreements could be en-
forced via section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 82
75. The Supreme Court held that section 301 (a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the
enforcement of. . . collective bargaining agreements." Id. at 451. Pursuant to
this principle, the Court further held that federal courts can specifically enforce
agreements to arbitrate contained in collective bargaining agreements. Id. For
further discussion of Lincoln Mills, see supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
76. 353 U.S. at 466. Justice Frankfurter noted that when Congress enacted
the United States Arbitration Act, it authorized federal courts to enforce arbitra-
tion provisions in contracts generally, but it explicitly excluded "contracts of
employment." Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 466, (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). If the
Act had applied to collective bargaining agreements, Frankfurter stated that the
"Court would hardly spin such power out of the empty darkness of § 301." Id.
Thus, from the Court's silent treatment of the Act, Justice Frankfurter found the
Court had rejected the availability of the Act to enforce arbitration clauses in
collective bargaining agreements. Id.
77. For a discussion of the lower court's opinion in Lincoln Mills, see infra
notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
78. Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956),
aff'd, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
79. 230 F.2d at 86.
80. For a definition and discussion of the Steelworkers Trilogy, see supra notes
2, 4 & 11 and accompanying text.
81. For a discussion of Lincoln Mills, see supra notes 17-20 and accompany-
ing text.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). For the text of section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, see supra note 37.
[Vol. 32: p. 57
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the United States Arbitration Act83 offered unions and employers
a potential means of enforcing agreements to arbitrate and, for
unions, a means of obtaining stays ofjudicial injunctions pending
arbitration of such issues as alleged wildcat strikes.8 4 While some
courts now reserve judgment on the issue of whether the Act ap-
plies and, instead, apply section 301,85 courts of the 1950's some-
times reserved judgment on the issue of whether section 301
applied and issued decisions based on interpretation of the Act. 86
These decisions of the 1950's are marked by creativity as some
courts sought to find a way to enforce labor arbitration agree-
ments; this approach later became national labor policy as
adopted under section 301 in Lincoln Mills.
8 7
The decisions are marked by a sharp split between those
courts that sought to apply the Act to all88 or most 89 collective
bargaining agreements in order, in part, to further what they saw
as a developing national labor policy to favor labor disputes, and
those courts that believed the Act to be confined in purpose to
commercial arbitration and to be unrelated to labor arbitration. 90
The debate centered on the language of section 1 excluding cer-
tain or all "contracts of employment." 9 '
A number of courts of appeals held the Act inapplicable to
arbitration arising under a collective bargaining agreement hold-
83. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). For the text of the various sections of the
United States Arbitration Act, see supra note 12.
84. See Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, Local 437, 207 F.2d
450 (3d Cir. 1953); International Union United Furniture Workers of America v.
Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948); Gatliff Coal Co.
v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944).
85. See, e.g., General Warehousemen & Helpers Local 767 v. Standard
Brands, Inc. 579 F.2d 1282, 1294-95 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978) (where parties did not
invoke jurisdiction under Arbitration Act, court declined to base holding on
Act), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 957; 443 U.S. 913 (1979). For a discussion of Stan-
dard Brands, see supra note 27. For a discussion of the current views of the vari-
ous circuits on the applicability of the Act, see supra notes 21-28 and
accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Tenney Eng'g v. United Elec. Radio & Machine Workers Local
437, 207 F.2d 450, 454 (3rd Cir. 1953) (unnecessary for court to decide whether
defendant would be entitled to relief under section 301).
87. For a discussion of the national labor policy set out in Lincoln Mills, see
supra note 75 and accompanying text. For a detailed review of the early cases,
see generally W. Sturges & 0. Murphy, supra note 63.
88. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 128-35 and accompany-
ing text.
89. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 104-27 and accompany-
ing text.
90. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 92-103 and accompany-
ing text.
91. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). For the text of section 1, see supra note 12.
1987]
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ing, as did the Fifth Circuit in Lincoln Mills,92 that a collective bar-
gaining agreement is a "contract of employment" under section
193 and, therefore, excluded.
International Union United Furniture Workers of America v. Colonial
Hardwood Flooring Co., Inc. ,94 involved a suit by an employer under
the Labor Management Relations Act of 194795 to recover dam-
ages caused by a strike. 96 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial
of the defendant union's motion to stay the proceedings so that
there could be arbitration pursuant to the Act, and held that the
collective bargaining agreement was within the exclusionary
clause of section 1 because it was a contract relating to interstate
commerce within the Act. 97 The court stated: "It is perfectly
clear, we think, that it was the intention of Congress to exclude
contracts of employment from the operation of all of these provi-
sions [of the Act]. Congress was steering clear of compulsory ar-
bitration of labor disputes .. "98
In Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l Union,99 the
union sued to enforce an arbitration award made under the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement.100 The district court invali-
dated the award and ordered further arbitration.10' Both parties
appealed. 0 2 The Tenth Circuit reversed that part of the judg-
ment directing additional arbitration and followed the Fourth Cir-
cuit in holding that labor contracts are specifically excluded from
92. 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
93. See United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of America v. Miller Metal
Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954); Mercury Oil Ref. Co. v. Oil Work-
ers Int'l Union, 187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951); International Union United Fur-
niture Workers of America v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., Inc., 168 F.2d
33 (4th Cir. 1948); Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944).
For a discussion of Colonial Hardwood, see infra notes 94 & 96-98 and accom-
panying text. for a discussion of Mercury Oil, see infra notes 99-103.
94. 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948).
95. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1982).
96. Colonial Hardwood, 168 F.2d at 34. The union moved for a stay of pro-
ceeding pursuant to section 3 of the United States Arbitration Act, on the
ground that the contract that was the basis of the suit contained an arbitration
provision. Id.
97. Id. at 35.
98. Id. at 36.
99. 187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951).
100. Id. at 981. The company contended that the award was ineffective and
asked that an award which was originally given be enforced. Id. Apparently,
after the first award was made, the union representative and the neutral partici-
pant modified the first award. Id. at 982. It is this second award that the union
attempted to enforce. Id.
101. Id. at 981.
102. Id.
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the Act. ' 0 3
Another group of courts, led by the Third Circuit, held that
even assuming a collective bargaining agreement was a "contract
of employment," the exclusionary clause in section 1 applied only
to employees actually in the transportation industries and not those
merely producing goodsfor commerce.10 4 The Third Circuit had
held in Amalgamated Ass 'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of
America, Local Division 1210 v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines 105 that
the Act was inapplicable to an action to enforce a labor arbitration
agreement of a collective bargaining agreement which was viewed
as an excluded "contract of employment."' 0 6 Two years later,
however, in Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers
of America, Local 437,107 the court distinguished Pennsylvania Grey-
hound Lines' 0 8 on the ground that the bus line employees had
been "directly engaged . . . in interstate transportation"' 0 9 and
that the Act's exclusion did not bar contracts of employees pro-
ducing goods for subsequent resale in interstate commerce." 0
Thus, applying the Act, the court allowed a union to obtain a stay
103. Id. at 983. The court also affirmed the district court's holding that
both arbitration awards were invalid. Id. The first award was ineffective because
it was not sufficiently definite as to require only ministerial acts of the parties to
effectuate the award. Id. at 982. The second award was invalid because the first
purported to be final and thereby the arbitrator had no power to proceed further
under the common law doctrine offunctus officio. Id. at 983.
104. For a discussion of courts which held that section 1 applied only to
employees actually in the transportation industries, see infra notes 105-27.
105. 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1951).
106. Id. at 313. The court first construed the words "nothing herein con-
tained" in section 1, contrary to its earlier decisions, to mean "nothing con-
tained in Title 9 [of the U.S.C.]" based on Congress' amendment of the caption
to section 1. Id. at 312-13. The court then concluded that it follows from this
construction that arbitration of a dispute arising out of a "contract of employ-
ment" cannot be required under the Act. Id. at 313.
Next, the court had to ascertain whether a collective bargaining agreement
was included in the Act's exception of "contracts of employment." The court
found it unreasonable to believe that Congress would have provided in the Act
for judicial intervention in the arbitration of collective bargaining agreement
disputes. Id. The court also found that the term "contract of employment" had
a broad enough meaning to include collective bargaining agreements. Id.
For the text of section 1, see supra note 12. For the Third Circuit's earlier
construction of the words "nothing herein contained" as meaning "nothing in
the foregoing definition of commerce," see Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151
F.2d 311 (3rd Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 777 (1946); Donahue v. Sus-
quahanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3rd Cir. 1943).
107. 207 F.2d 450 (3rd Cir. 1953).
108. For a discussion of Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, see supra notes 105-06
and accompanying text.
109. 207 F.2d at 453 & n.13.
110. Id.
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of a damages action pending arbitration.I I
The Tenney court held that, in writing the exclusionary lan-
guage of section 1,112 the draftsmen of the Act were concerned
with the problems of exempting classes of workers for whom
Congress had already provided arbitration or dispute adjustment
machinery, such as seamen, 3 whose union representative had
opposed application of the Act to seamen's contracts,' 14 and rail-
road employees. 115 The addition of "any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" was intended, rea-
soned the court, to reach only those employees who, like seamen
and railroad employees, were "actually engaged in the movement
of interstate or foreign commerce or in work so closely related
thereto as to be in practical effect part of it."116
The court also noted that, in 1925, the concept of interstate
commerce was narrow. 17 The court felt that the language of the
Act paralleled language which had been construed by the
Supreme Court in 1916 to apply only to employees engaged in
interstate transportation or work closely related." 8 Rather, the
111. Id. at 454. See also 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982) (authorizing court to stay
proceedings).
112. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). For the text of section 1, see supra note 12.
113. 207 F.2d at 452. In support of this the court pointed to a statute
which provides for arbitration by shipping commissioners. Id. at 452 n.7 (citing
46 U.S.C. § 651).
114. Id. at 452 & n. 7 . The court quoted the following language from the
report of the bar association committee which drafted the Act:
Objections to the bill were urged by Mr. Andrew Furuseth as rep-
resenting the Seamen's Union, Mr. Furuseth taking the position that
seamen's wages came within admiralty jurisdiction and should not be
subject to an agreement to arbitrate. In order to eliminate this opposi-
tion, the committee consented to an amendment to Section 1 as fol-
lows: 'but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees or any other class of work-
ers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.'
Id. at 452 (quoting 48 A.B.A. REP. 287 (1923)).
115. Id. at 452 & n.8. The court cited two federal acts in support of this
point. Id. at 452 n.8 (citing Transportation Act, 1920, ch. 91, §§ 300-316, 41
Stat. 456, 469-74 (1920), and the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 157).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 453. The court stated that "[i]t must be remembered that the
Arbitration Act of 1925 was drawn and passed at a time when the concept of
Congressional power over individuals whose activities affected interstate com-
merce had not developed to the extent to which it was expanded in succeeding
years." Id. (footnote omitted).
118. Id. at 453 n. 11 (citing Shanks v. Delaware L. & W. R.R. Co., 239 U.S.
556 (1916)). In Shanks, the court had to determine whether an employee who
worked for a railroad and who was injured while working in a repair shop could
recover for his injuries under the Federal Employer Liability Act of 1908. 239
U.S. at 557-58. The Shanks Court quoted the pertinent part of the Act as fol-
[Vol. 32: p. 57
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Third Circuit stated that when Congress wanted to reach a
broader class, it spoke not only to employees "engaged in com-
merce" but also to those engaged "in the production of goods for
commerce" as it had done in the Fair Labor Standards Act.' 19
Following the lead of the Third Circuit, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, in Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec.
Radio and Mach. Workers of America,120 held that the Act was appli-
cable to a collective bargaining agreement and, thus, declined to
decide whether a collectively bargained arbitration agreement
was enforceable under section 301 of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act. 12' The court reached this result by concluding that
exclusion in section 1 of the Act applies only to those workers
actually involved in the transportation industries. 22 In support
of this conclusion, the court then noted that the Seamen's union
had requested that Congress insert the exclusionary language of
section 1 because the union did not want its contracts subject to
arbitration. 123 Thus, the court found that if it held that collective
bargaining agreements involving workers of the transportation
industries were not "contracts of employment," and hence not
lows: " 'Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between
any of the several states ... shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce .... .' " Id. at 557
(quoting 45 U.S.C. § 51). In order to ascertain if the railroad was liable, the
Court had to determine if Shanks was "employed by the [railroad] in [interstate]
commerce." Id. The Court stated that the test for such employment was
whether "the employee at the time of injury [was] engaged in interstate trans-
portation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it." Id. at
558. Applying the test to Shanks, the Court concluded that the work he was
performing at the time of his injury, namely, repairing a fixture at the shop, was
not a close enough connection to interstate commerce and hence, the railroad
was not liable. Id. at 560.
119. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 453 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1938)). The pertinent
part of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") states: "Every employer shall
pay to each of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce wages at the following rates ...... Ch. 676, § 6(a), 52 Stat.
1060, 1062 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982)) (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court later noted that Congress was well aware of the
difference in the coverage of the language used in the FLSA. See McLeod v.
Threlkend, 319 U.S. 491, 493 n.2 (1943). The Court also noted that the pur-
pose of the FLSA was to extend coverage to the "farthest reaches of the chan-
nels of interstate commerce." Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564,
567 (1943) (footnote omitted).
120. 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956).
121. Id. at 301 (footnote omitted).
122. Id. at 302 (citing Tenney).
123. Id. Apparently, the Seamen's union felt that its contractual disputes
came within the admiralty jurisdiction and, therefore, should not be subjected to
arbitration. Id. For a discussion of the union's opposition, see supra note 114
and accompanying text.
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within the section 1 exclusion, the court would be defeating the
congressional intent. 12 4
In applying its conclusion to the present case, the Signal-Stat
court found that the employee involved in the case was "merely
engaged in the manufacture of goods for interstate commerce"
and thus, "not actually engaged in interstate and foreign com-
merce."12 5 Additionally, the court noted that "the present, al-
most universal, approval of arbitration as a means for settling
labor disputes, including the express approval of Congress,"12 6
led it to conclude that courts should interpret the Act "so as to
further, rather than impede arbitration in this area."' 2 7
Finally, some courts took a narrower view of section 1 and
held the Act applicable to all collective bargaining agreements.
For example, in Hoover Motor Express Co., Inc. v. Teamsters Local
Union No. 327,128 the Sixth Circuit held that collective bargaining
agreements were within the purview of the Act. 129 In distinguish-
ing its earlier stance that the Act did not apply,13 0 the court found
persuasive the argument that a collective bargaining agreement
was a trade agreement rather than a contract of employment.' 3 '
For this proposition, the court relied on the Supreme Court's
analysis injI. Case Co. v. NLRB,' 3 2 a leading case on the relation
124. 235 F.2d at 302.
125. Id. at 303. The workers involved in this case manufactured automotive
electrical equipment. Id. at 300.
126. Id. at 302-03 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 171(c), 173(d)).
127. Id.
128. 217 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1954).
129. Id. at 53.
130. See Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876, 882 (6th Cir. 1944). In Gat-
l/if, an employee of the union sought to recover wages that Gatliff allegedly owed
him under a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 878. Gatliff moved for a
stay of proceedings under section 3 of the Act until arbitration had been com-
pleted. Id. at 879. The district court denied the motion and Gatliff appealed.
Id.
The court of appeals found the exclusionary language of section 1 applica-
ble to the entire Act. Id. at 882. The court reasoned that the use of the word
"herein" in a section where "none of the substantive matter set up in the suc-
ceeding sections of the Act appeared must mean that it is to be applied to the
whole Act. ... Id. The court then concluded that the contract at issue was a
"contract of employment" and affirmed the district court's order denying the
stay of proceedings. Id.
131. Hoover Motor Express, 217 F.2d at 52. The court denied that Gatliff
stood for the proposition that a collective bargaining agreement was a contract
of employment. Id. Instead, the court stated that Gatlif supports the proposi-
tion that an "individual hiring for wages falls within the exception [of the Act]".
Id.
132. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
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between individual and collective agreements, where justice Jack-
son had stated:
Contract in labor law is a term the implications of which
must be determined from the connection in which it ap-
pears. Collective bargaining between employer and the
representatives of a unit, usually a union, results in an
accord as to terms which will govern hiring and work and
pay in that unit. The result is not, however, a contract of
employment except in rare cases; no one has a job by
reason of it and no obligation to any individual ordina-
rily comes into existence from it alone. The negotiations
between union and management result in what often has
been called a trade agreement rather than in a contract
of employment. 33
The Hoover Motor Express court then concluded that the ex-
ception contained in section 1 "was intended to avoid the specific
performance of contracts for personal services and not to apply to
collective labor agreements."'134 Rather, the court saw only the
individual hiring of a person employed under a collective agree-
ment to be the "contract of employment" which the Act
excluded. 135
IV. RECENT APPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES ARBITRATION
ACT TO REVIEW AWARDS
Section 10 of the United States Arbitration Act' 3 6 provides
that an arbitration award may be vacated:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud,
or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in
the arbitrators, or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence perti-
nent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced.
133. Id. at 334-36.
134. Hoover Motor Express, 217 F.2d at 53 (citing Lewittes & Sons v. United
Furniture Workers of America, 95 F. Supp. 851, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)).
135. Id.
136. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
19871
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(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.' 3 7
On their face, these provisions seem to give courts wide lati-
tude to review arbitration awards, latitude which in the field of
labor arbitration can lead to litigation and delay that compromise
the finality of awards. Fortunately, those courts that apply the Act
to arbitration arising under collective bargaining agreements
have not pushed their authority to the limits and have used dis-
cretion in interpreting these provisions. The mere existence of
these statutory standards, however, may have encouraged litiga-
tion by parties who fail to understand the narrow grounds under
which courts will vacate awards.
The terms "fraud" or "undue means" used in section
10(a)' 38 could theoretically render vulnerable every award where
there is a factual dispute with the losing party charging fraud.
Fortunately, the courts have generally read the provisions nar-
rowly. In Local 261 v. Great Northern Paper Co. ,39 the district court
was faced with a claim that an arbitration award upholding the
discharge of a company employee was procured by "fraud or un-
due means" under section 10(a).' 40 The union claimed that the
company's post-arbitration hearing brief to the arbitrator con-
tained a misstatement of fact.' 4 ' Looking at standards developed
in the Ninth Circuit' 42 and Second Circuit,14" the court rejected
137. Id. Section 10(e) allows the court to order a new hearing when it has
vacated the award. This provision states: "[w]here an award is vacated and the
time within which the agreement required the award to be made has not expired,
the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators." Id.
§ 10(e).
138. Id. § 10(a).
139. 118 L.R.R.M. 2317 (D. Me. 1984).
140. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1982).
141. Great Northern Paper, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2322. The union pointed to a
statement in the company's post-arbitration brief to the effect that the union's
safety defense was not raised as required in the pre-arbitration grievance stage.
Id.
142. The court quoted the Ninth Circuit for the proposition that:
[I]n order to protect the finality of arbitration decisions, courts must be
slow to vacate an arbitral award on the ground of fraud . . . . The
fraud must not have been discoverable upon the exercise of due dili-
gence prior to the arbitration. . . . The fraud must materially relate to
an issue in the arbitration . . . [and] must be established by clear and
convincing evidence.
Id. at 2322 (quoting Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th
Cir. 1982)).
[Vol. 32: p. 57
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the claim and held that the alleged misstatement did not consti-
tute "fraud or undue means." 144 The court also noted that the
union could have countered any asserted misstatement in its own
post-hearing brief.145 Finally, the court stated: "The Court re-
jects any suggestion that an arbitrator is not capable of distin-
guishing the evidence actually presented to the arbitrator at the
arbitration hearing from a recitation of nonevidence appearing in the
post-hearing brief by a party to the arbitration."'' 46 The court
also rejected a claim under section 10(a)147 that the company case
was based on perjured testimony, noting that the union had
presented no reason for its failure to present to the arbitrator the
new testimony it now sought to present in court to prove the
award incorrect. 148
While section 10(a) 149 is directed at fault on the part of one
of the parties ("procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means"), 150 section (b),151 (c),' 5 2 and (d) 153 are directed at possi-
ble fault on the part of the arbitrator. With regard to section
10(b),' 54 no one would disagree that "corruption" on the part of
the arbitrator is grounds for vacating an award. 155 Courts which
do not apply the Act will also overturn awards based on corrup-
tion. 156 The term "evident partiality,"' 157 however, may tend to
143. The court quoted the Second Circuit for the proposition that:
[Tihe "undue means" if [9 U.S.C. § 10(a)], when read in conjunction
with "corruption" and "fraud," does not cover a case where a party
openly offered evidence even for the sole purpose of causing prejudice,
at least when, as here, the arbitrators declined to receive it and stated
that they had not been prejudiced and would act only on the evidence
before them.
Id. at 2322-23 (quoting Drayer v. Krasner, 512 F.2d 348, 352 (2d Cir. 1978)).
144. Id. at 2323.
145. Id. at 2323 n.1.
146. Id. at 2323 (emphasis in original).
147. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1982).
148. Great Northern Paper, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2323.
149. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1982).
150. Id.
151. Id. § 10(b).
152. Id. § 10(c).
153. Id. § 10(d).
154. Id. § 10(b).
155. See, e.g., Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 990 (1982) (fraud on part of arbitrator is ground for vacat-
ing judgment under section 10(b)). However, courts have generally been reluc-
tant to find fraud. See, e.g., Morelite Construction Corp. v. N.Y.C. District
Council Carpenter's Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79 (1984) (although standards of
disqualification for arbitrators are less stringent then those for judges, some-
thing more than "appearance of bias" is required to vacate award).
156. Courts that do not apply the Arbitration Act, but instead follow the
19871
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encourage litigation. In the labor sector, parties may be very in-
volved in the correctness of their positions and, in the emotion-
ally charged atmosphere of the hearing room, every procedural
or evidentiary ruling that goes against a party may be viewed as
"evident partiality."1 5 8 Here, too, however, the courts have used
discretion in applying the appropriate standard. The mere fact
that an arbitrator consistently rules against a party at hearing and
in his or her award is not sufficient to show partiality. For exam-
ple, in Bell Aerospace Co. v. Local 516,159 Local 516 filed two griev-
ances, claiming that jobs properly belonging to its members
under the collective bargaining agreement had been assigned to
another union.' 60 After losing in arbitration, Local 205 attacked
the award, alleging evident partiality on the part of the arbitra-
tor. 61 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found no
evidence of bias or prejudice as the only evidence was that the
arbitrator's rulings consistently favored the other union. 162
Section 10(c) of the Act allows vacation of an award where
the arbitrator was guilty of "misconduct" in refusing postpone-
ment for cause shown or in refusing to hear material and perti-
nent evidence, or "of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced."' 163 This section, if taken liter-
ally, renders vulnerable every arbitration decision that is the re-
sult of a hearing where there are contested matters of procedure
and/or evidence. While the courts have not usually read this sec-
tion broadly in recent arbitration cases, one suspects that the sec-
tion is the cause of much groundless litigation in circuits which
apply the Act to labor arbitration. Arbitral refusals to hear or
consider evidence have been frequent sources of litigation under
this section. Courts have generally ruled that it is for the arbitra-
tor to determine the weight and relevance of the evidence and
that every failure to admit relevant evidence is not misconduct
Enterprise Wheel standard, are presented with a problem in that Enterprise Wheel
makes no explicit provision for review based on misconduct of the arbitrator.
For a discussion of the Enterprise Wheel standard, see supra notes 2 & 4 and ac-
company text.
157. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1982).
158. Id. For the text of section 10(b), see supra text accompanying note
137.
159. 500 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1974).
160. Id. at 922.
161. Id. at 923.
162. Id.
163. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1982).
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sufficient to vacate an award.' 64 Only if the refusal is to hear per-
tinent and material evidence and this refusal prejudices the rights
of the parties may an award be vacated under section 10(c). 165
The mere refusal to hear evidence that is only cumulative or irrel-
evant will not meet this standard. 6 6 Basically, the question has
become whether the party was "deprived of a fair hearing."' 16 7
In Grahams Service Inc. v. Teamsters Local 975,168 the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the employer's claim that
an award directing reinstatement of a discharged employee
should be vacated under section 10(c) of the Act for miscon-
duct. 169 After making reference to Third Circuit precedent inter-
preting section 10(c), the court ruled that the employer's
complaints about the arbitrator's refusal to admit certain nota-
rized letters and his refusal to postpone the hearing to allow the
company to present witnesses in lieu of the excluded letters did
not constitute misconduct and did not deprive the company of a
fair hearing.170
164. See, e.g., Newark Stereotypers Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning
Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594, 599 (3d Cir.) (arbitrator's refusal to investigate claim
that employer had stifled earlier readiness of witness to testify for union not
sufficient grounds for vacating award), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954 (1968); Graphic
Arts, Inc. Union v. Haddon Craftsmen Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1088 (M.D. Pa. 1979)
(award not vacated where arbitrator refused to admit evidence by company
counsel who had earlier admitted no evidentiary conflict between parties on that
matter); Trident Technical College v. Lucas & Stubbs, Ltd., 286 S.C. 98, 333
S.E.2d 781 (1985) (arbitration award not vacated despite arbitration panel's re-
fusal to grant party opportunity to file briefs on all issues and present oral argu-
ments), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 803 (1986).
165. 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1982). For the text of section 10(c), see supra text
accompanying note 137.
166. See, e.g., National Post Office Mailhandlers v. United States Postal Ser-
vice, 751 F.2d 834, 841 (6th Cir. 1985).
167. See, e.g., Newark Stereotypers Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning
Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594, 599 (3d Cir.) (error of arbitrator must not simply be
error of term, but error which so affects rights of party that party was deprived
of fair hearing), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954 (1968); Trident Technical College v.
Lucas & Stubbs, Ltd., 286 S.C. 98, 103, 333 S.E.2d 781, 788 (1985) (touchstone
in considering claims of arbitrator misconduct is fairness), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
803 (1986).
168. 700 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1982). Concurring, Judge Gibson wrote sepa-
rately to point out that the Eighth Circuit was not necessarily adopting the Act as
applicable to labor arbitration. Id. at 424 (Gibson, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 422.
170. Id. at 422-23. The letters excluded pertained to an employee's work
record. The issue before the arbitrator was whether that employee's conduct
constituted a major violation of company rules and if not, whether the company
warned the employee in writing before it fired him. Id. Since the company pro-
duced testimony regarding the nature of the employee's offense, the letters were
said to be of little relevance. Id.
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Similarly, in Bell Aerospace, 17 1 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit refused to vacate an award under section 10(c) 172
where the losing union alleged it had been prejudiced by the arbi-
trator's "misbehavior" in referring to an affidavit allegedly not
placed in evidence.' 73 In dismissing this claim, the court noted
that the affidavit was part of an NLRB case record stipulated as
relevant and that "[i]n handling evidence an arbitrator need not
follow all the niceties observed by the federal courts. He need
only grant the parties a fundamentally fair hearing."'' 74
In Local Union No. 251 v. Narragansett Improvement Co.,175 a
case involving the contractual validity of a discharge, the company
sought a postponement to present further testimony about previ-
ous discharges and the employee's accident record. 176 The arbi-
trator denied the request and the company sought to have the
arbitrator's award granting reinstatement vacated on the ground
that the refusal constituted "misconduct" under section 10(c) of
the Act. 177 In upholding the district court's refusal to vacate the
award, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit interpreted sec-
tion 10(c) as allowing the arbitrator discretion and held that the
company had not been deprived of a fair proceeding. 78 The
court noted that the company provided no explanation in support
of its motion at arbitration, there was no indication that witnesses
were not available at the time of hearing, and there was no asser-
tion of surprise. 179 The court held that a mere request for post-
ponement does not constitute a right to postponement. 180
As noted above, most cases concerning the weight of evi-
dence and procedural matters have upheld the arbitrator's broad
discretion in these areas. One recent exception, however, oc-
curred in the First Circuit. In its 1985 decision in Hoteles Condado
Beach v. Loc ! 901,8 1 the court held that the arbitrator had abused
171. 500 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1974).
172. 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1982).
173. Bell Aerospace, 500 F.2d at 923.
174. Id.; see also M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION 22(1980) (arbitrator is judge of admissibility of evidence submitted in arbitration
proceeding). For further discussion of Bell Aerospace, see supra notes 159-62 and
accompanying text.
175. 503 F.2d 309 (1st Cir. 1974).
176. Id. at 311.
177. Id. at 310.
178. Id. at 312.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 763 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1985).
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his discretion by refusing to give weight to testimony given at
criminal proceedings against a discharged employee. 8 2 In the
case of an employee discharged for allegedly exposing himself
before a hotel guest, the court ruled that the arbitrator correctly
concluded he was not bound to find the discharge justified by the
grievant's criminal conviction, 8 3 but that the arbitrator erred by
refusing to give any weight to the transcript of testimony given at
the criminal proceedings which had been admitted into evidence
over the union's objection. 184 The arbitrator had granted the
union's motion to sequester the husband of the company's only
witness. The witness then refused to testify since her husband
was prohibited from being present during her testimony. 8 5
The company, over union objection, then introduced the
transcript of her testimony at criminal proceedings. 8 6 The arbi-
trator admitted the transcript but ultimately ruled that the tran-
script provided insufficient evidence to justify discharge because
it did not enable him to assess the credibility and demeanor of the
witness.' 8 7 The court held that the arbitrator's refusal to give any
weight to the criminal trial transcript, coupled with his ruling that
the husband of the witness could not be present for her testi-
mony, denied the company a full and fair hearing even though the
sequestration itself was not deemed beyond the arbitrator's au-
thority.' 88 This case demonstrates the risk of section 10(c).' 8 9 It
permits a court to substitute its judgment for that of the
arbitrator.
Section 10(d) 190 explicitly authorizes a court to examine the
award to determine if the arbitrator has exceeded his or her
"powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
182. Id. at 40. The court concluded that the testimony of the criminal pro-
ceeding was unquestionably relevant to a determination of whether the dis-
charged employee engaged in immoral conduct in violation of the company's
disciplinary regulations. Id. The evidence excluded was "central and decisive"
to the company's decision; therefore, in the court's view, its exclusion denied the
company the right to present its case. Id.
183. Id. at 39. The court agreed that the arbitrator was not bound by either
the criminal court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses or the judg-
ment rendered in the criminal proceedings. Id. The criminal conviction was
later overturned. Id. at 36.
184. Id. at 40.
185. Id. at 37.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 42.
189. 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1982).
190. Id. § 10(d).
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definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made."''o In many cases, this section has provided the basis for a
court to remand a matter to the arbitrator for clarification of the
scope of an award or to clarify its application. 192 In cases of more
serious ambiguity, awards have been remanded for clarification of
the issue of whether an award was made at all with respect to a
particular issue. 193
With regard to whether the arbitrator has exceeded the pow-
ers delegated him or her by the parties under section 10(d), the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has suggested that the
"exceeded their powers" test of the Act is "in meaning if not in
words"' 194 the same as the "draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement" standard articulated in Enterprise Wheel.' 95
In support of the proposed similarity between the two tests, the
Enterprise Wheel standard can be and has been used by courts to
modify or vacate arbitration awards based on alleged mistakes of
fact, despite the fact that courts using the standard usually refrain
191. See id.
192. See, e.g., Grand Rapids Die Casting Corp. v. Local Union No. 159, 684
F.2d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1982) (since arbitrator did not decide question
presented to him, remand appropriate); International Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 626 F.2d 715 (9th Cir.
1980) (court could not determine whether overtime pay award applied to simi-
larly situated employees as well as named claimants); Refino v. Fever Transp.
Inc., 480 F. Supp. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (court cannot enforce any part of arbitra-
tion award which is so ambiguous that it lends itself to no definite interpretation,
aft'd, 633 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1980). Teamsters Local 25 v. Penn Transp. Corp.,
359 F. Supp. 344 (D. Mass. 1973) (matter resubmitted to arbitrators to deter-
mine how back pay should be calculated and method to be followed in reinstat-
ing employees).
193. See, e.g., United States Steelworkers of America v. Timken Roller Bear-
ing Co., 324 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1963) (whether back pay was awarded); Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Ass'n v. West Gulf Maritime Ass'n, 594 F. Supp. 670
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (whether arbitration panel rendered final award under unusual
voting procedures that parties had apparently adopted).
194. Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 768 F.2d 180, 184 (7th
Cir. 1985).
195. However, the Ethyl court noted that application of the Enterprise Wheel
standard invites error by the judge who applies it to a situation where the arbi-
trator misread the agreement. Id. at 184. This misinterpretation may be termed
by the reviewing judges as not "draw[ing] its essence from the collective bar-
gaining agreement." Id. "But so long as the award is based on the arbitrator's
interpretation-unsound though it may be--of the contract, it draws its essence
from the contract [and the award may not be vacated.]" Id. According to the
Ethyl court, under the Enterprise Wheel test, the award may be vacated only if the
award must be based on some factor outside the contract. Id. at 185. The Ethyl
court suggested the better wording of the test would be the "exceeded their
powers" test of the Act. Id. at 184. For a discussion of the standard articulated
in Enterprise Wheel, see supra note 2.
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from reviewing the merits of the award.' 96
In Detroit Coil Co. v. International Ass 'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers,19 7 the company claimed that the arbitrator exceeded his
authority under the bargaining agreement by ignoring its express
terms when making his determination.19 8 The district court re-
fused to review the correctness of the arbitrator's decision, so
long as it was based on the contract and its past interpretation
and application.19 9 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that " 'if
an examination of the record before the arbitrator reveals no sup-
port whatever for his determinations, his award must be va-
cated.' "200 In a similar, more recent case,20 ' Justice Stewart,
sitting by designation, spoke for the Sixth Circuit 20 2 in citing sec-
tion 10(d) 20 3 for the proposition that:
Where the record that was before the arbitrator demon-
strates an unambiguous and undisputed mistake of fact
and the record demonstrates strong reliance on that mis-
take by the arbitrator in making his award, it can fairly be
said that the arbitrator "exceeded [his] powers or so im-
perfectly executed them" that vacation may be
proper.20 4
V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION
The issue of whether the United States Arbitration Act 205 ap-
196. It has been stated that "applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act to
labor collective bargaining agreements is of particular significance because it
may provide a statutory standard of review that would preempt the judicial stan-
dard that has evolved from the Steelworkers Trilogy and subsequent cases." Mark-
ham, Judicial Review of an Arbitrator's Award under Section 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 39 TENN. L. REV. 613, 642 (1972).
197. 594 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1979).
198. Id. at 577.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 581 (citation omitted).
201. National Post Office Mailhandlers v. United States Postal Services, 751
F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1985).
202. Id. For a discussion of the holding in that case, see infra note 204 and
accompanying text.
203. 751 F.2d at 843 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1982)).
204. National Post Office, 751 F.2d at 843. In National Post Office, the arbitra-
tor upheld the discharge of a postal employee who had been indicted for drug
trafficking. Id. at 838. The arbitrator's decision was based in part on his mis-
taken belief that the employee had pleaded guilty to the charge prior to his be-
ing fired. Id. The court held this to be an indisputable mistake of fact that
played a central if not essential role in the arbitrator's decision to uphold the
discharge. Id.
205. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
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plies to review of labor arbitration awards is not an easy one to
resolve.20 6 Current courts are split 20 7 and early decisions on the
issue are conflicting and confusing. 20 8 It is the position of this
article that the answer to the question is to be found in the limited
legislative history of the Act and in the national labor policies that
are served by a swift, binding, and final labor arbitration process.
It is the position of this article that the Act should not be applied
to the review of arbitration awards issued under collective bar-
gaining agreements and, instead, the common law approach of
Enterprise Wheel 20 9 should be allowed to further evolve to properly
recognize the unique status of the labor arbitrator operating
under a collective bargaining agreement.
That the Act should not apply to arbitration arising under
collective bargaining agr~ements is supported both by analysis of
the legislative history of the section 1 exclusion and by a look at
the overall purpose of the Act. While the legislative history of the
section 1 exclusion for "contracts of employment" has been accu-
rately described as "slender," 2i 0 this should not cause us to ig-
nore what history does exist nor to ignore the overwhelming
evidence that the Act itself was directed to the problems of com-
mercial arbitration and not to labor arbitration.
As to the exclusion, it seems clear that at least parts of organ-
ized labor spoke out against the bill as originally drafted without
the exclusion.2 11 With the exclusion, there was no opposition
206. See, e.g., Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 HARV. L. REV.
591, 598-99 (1954). "As a matter of substantive law an agreement to arbitrate
future disputes is valid and binding on the parties." Id. at 601. But problems
arise when one party refuses to submit to arbitration under an agreement pro.
viding for such arbitration. Id. The author proceeds to examine the circum-
stances under which a party may seek judicial enforcement of an arbitration
provision. Id. Noting that the then current legislation reflected a congressional
belief in the necessity of expanding the courts' role in labor relations, the author
recognized the possible effects of such expanded judicial power: "If some mea-
sure ofjudicial intervention is the inevitable price ofjudicial assistance, provid-
ing for judicial enforcement of arbitration awards and agreements to arbitrate
will inevitably stir up litigation by dissatisfied parties and bring about a number
of decisions quite contrary to the results of the arbitration process." Id. at 605.
207. For a discussion of cases indicative of the split of authority, see supra
notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
208. For a discussion of these early cases, see supra notes 94-135 and ac-
companying text.
209. 363 U.S. 593 (1960). For a discussion of Enterprise Wheel, see supra
notes 2 & 4 and accompanying text.
210. Cox, supra note 206, at 596.
211. For a discussion of the original draft of the bill, see supra notes 63-69
and accompanying text.
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from any quarter.2 12 While the opposition appears to have been
initially led by the Seafarers Union, 213 the exclusion speaks not
only in terms of excluding seamen but also of excluding "any
other class of workers" in interstate commerce. 214 Thus, it was
aimed at a broader group than seamen. The term seems to en-
compass all persons reachable by the statute itself.
It is reported that other parts of labor opposed the initial bill
as well. 215 Organized labor had reason to distrust courts in 1924.
Numerous decisions hostile to labor had been issued in the early
1900's.216 Further, organized labor of the time generally op-
posed compulsory arbitration to settle labor disputes. The Amer-
ican Federation of Labor ("Federation") of the early 1920's was
itself concerned about and opposed to laws requiring compulsory
arbitration. 217 A number of states had passed or were consider-
ing compulsory arbitration legislation which limited picketing and
strikes and gave courts power to regulate terms and conditions of
employment as well as to set wages.2 18 Thus, it is quite under-
standable that organized labor would want labor completely ex-
cluded from any federal statute dealing with arbitration. Indeed,
it was the official position of the Federation in the mid-1920's to
reject almost all forms of governmental involvement in labor rela-
tions including "compulsory arbitration, compulsory investiga-
tion of industrial disputes, industrial courts, and similar devices
which involve limitations upon the right to strike and regulation
of relations between employers and employees by law." 219
This position of opposing laws and legislation on arbitration
was carried into practice as well. For example, the Building
Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor had, at
212. For a discussion of the legislative history on this point, see supra note
73.
213. Cox, supra note 206, at 596.
214. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). For the complete text of section 1 see supra note
12.
215. For a discussion of the opposition to the initial bill, see supra notes 54-
62 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921)
(allowing injunction under antitrust laws against boycott activity despite Clayton
Act limits on injunctions); Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229
(1917) (enforcing "yellow dog contract" by enjoining union from trying to or-
ganize persons who had signed contracts promising not to become union mem-
bers); and Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (potential antitrust liability for
strike and boycott activity).
217. Lorwin, THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 213 (1933).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 401-02, (citing Proceedings of the 46th Annual Convention of
the American Federation of Labor).
19871
35
Ray: Court Review of Labor Arbitration Awards under the Federal Arbitr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1987
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the time, a rule providing that no local building trade council
could enter into any agreement with an employer's association
providing for compulsory arbitration. 220
For these reasons, it is quite legitimate to read section 1 as
excluding from the coverage of the Act all labor agreements. La-
bor opposed the original bill. Once it was changed, labor no
longer spoke against it.221
The decisions of the 1940's and 1950's which attempted to
interpret the section 1 exclusion do not compel a different re-
sult.22 2 As Professor Cox has pointed oUt, 223 cases holding that
Congress intended the words "engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce," to reach only a limited number of contracts of em-
ployment, are open to substantial question.22 4 As Professor Cox
notes, Congress in 1924 would not have been familiar with either
the precise words of art or the fine distinctions regarding the
commerce power which were only later developed. 225 Thus it is
equally likely, if not more likely, that Congress did intend to ex-
clude all contracts of employment within the reach of federal reg-
ulation and the Act.
Similarly, cases holding the Act applicable because they in-
terpret the exclusion for "contracts of employment" as not in-
cluding collective bargaining agreements are suspect. 22 6 They
rely on chance words in a 1944 Supreme Court definition of the
term "collective bargaining agreement." 22 7 The statutory lan-
220. Id. at 376.
221. For a discussion of labor's reaction to the change, see supra notes 65-
74 and accompanying text.
222. For a discussion of the cases which attempted to interpret the section
1 exclusion, see supra notes 94-135 and accompanying text.
223. Cox, supra note 206, at 598.
224. Id.
225. Id.; see, e.g., McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 498 (1943) (holding
that cook for maintenance men on railroad not "engaged in commerce"); Wall-
ing v.Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 566 (1943) (holding that employees
engaged in procurement or receipt of goods from other states are "engaged in
commerce"); Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 524 (1942) (holding that
employees "'engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for com-
merce' " includes those "engaged in occupations 'necessary to the production'
of goods for commerce"); Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S.
349, 355 (1941) (where court read " 'unfair methods of competition in [inter-
state] commerce' " to mean same as " 'unfair methods of competition in any way
affecting interstate commerce' ").
226. For a discussion of the cases which interpret "contracts of employ-
ment" as not including collective bargaining agreements, see supra notes 94-103
and accompanying text.
227. SeeJ.I. Case, 321 U.S. 332. In this case, J.I. Case offered identical con-
tracts of employment to all of its employees to sign at their option. Id. at 333.
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guage was drafted in 1924, long before theJ.. Case opinion was
issued. 228 The issue before the Court there was the impact of in-
dividual contracts on collective bargaining, not the definition of
statutory terms. 229 As Justice Jackson himself noted in the J..
Case opinion, "[c]ontract in labor law is a term the implications of
which must be determined from the connection in which it
appears."
2 30
In addition, and even more compelling, is the fact that the
bill itself, even without the exclusion, was aimed clearly and di-
rectly at the problems of commercial arbitration exclusively. In
Congressional hearings23 1 and on the floor of Congress, 23 2 the
emphasis was on the problems of "merchants" and "commercial
arbitration." There is no evidence of an intent to affirmatively
reach arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement. This
is not particularly surprising because modern grievance arbitra-
tion, as we know it, did not exist in 1924. While there were some
agreements providing for voluntary labor arbitration by impartial
arbitrators, particularly in the garment trades, the printing indus-
The contract terms provided for the company's paying a specified wage and
maintaining hospital facilities for employees, while employees signing were to
accept the provisions, serve the employer faithfully, and abide by company rules.
Id. Approximately 75% of the company's employees signed the contracts. Id.
After the National Labor Relations Board ("Board") received a union peti-
tion for certification as the bargaining representative of Case's employees, the
Board directed an election which resulted in the union becoming the exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees. Id. Upon union request for bar-
gaining, Case refused to negotiate any matters contained in the employment
contracts before their expiration, maintaining that the contracts represented the
benefits to signatory employees and prevailed during their effective term. Id. at
334.
The Board held Case in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, and
the court of appeals granted an order of enforcement. Id. The Supreme Court
agreed with the appellate court, and held that a collective trade agreement -
produced by negotiations between the union and the employer - is not a con-
tract for employment. Id. at 335. The procedures prescribed by the National
Labor Relations Act or by a particular collective trade agreement cannot be im-
peded by individual employment contracts. Id. The contracts here were held by
the Court to be subsidiary to collective trade agreements to be negotiated by the
union, and Case was ordered to proceed to negotiations. Id.
228. Id. at 335-37.
229. Id. at 334.
230. Id. It has also been noted that collective bargaining agreements were
referred to as employment contracts throughout the congressional debates on
the 1947 Labor Management Relations Act. Burstein, supra note 41 at 134.
231. For a discussion of these hearings see supra notes 46-60 and accompa-
nying text.
232. 65 CONG. REC. 1931, 11,080 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924); 66 CONG.
REC. 984, 68th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1924). For a further discussion of the congres-
sional debates see supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
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try, and some railroads, 233 the real growth of labor arbitration for
resolution of grievances occurred only after World War 11.234 Ar-
bitration was initially limited to interest disputes, especially the
setting of the terms of a new contract in strike situations. 235
Thus, it is not reasonable to infer that Congress intended to reach
a form of arbitration which is substantially different from the
commercial arbitration upon which Congress focused and which
did not even exist in 1924.
Not only is coverage of labor arbitration under the Act not
compelled or even justified by the terms of the Act or its history,
there is no sound policy reason for interpreting the Act to reach
labor arbitration. Labor arbitration is different from typical litiga-
tion and from commercial arbitration because it involves a coun-
tinuing relationship between the parties to the contract. The
award of a labor arbitrator involves not only a possible remedy
for a past breach but also a ruling governing the ongoing opera-
tions of the parties under the collective bargaining agreement.
Rather than being merely an efficient substitute for litigation as it
is in a commercial context, arbitration in a labor context is much
more. 23 6 Labor agreements are often drafted by non-lawyers and
contain ambiguities which the parties realize may have to be re-
solved by a labor arbitrator. In many ways, the labor arbitrator is
part of this continuing relationship.
Further, labor arbitration is only a small part of the overall
relationship of employer and union. Even as a dispute settlement
mechanism, it is but a small part of the grievance resolution
233. Lorwin, supra note 217, at 532.
234. Fleming, Reflections on the Nature of Labor Arbitration, 61 MICH. L. REV.
1245, 1246 (1963).
235. Id. at 1247. The author notes that labor arbitration has had different
meanings throughout its history, from mediation and conciliation in collective
bargaining, to setting the terms of new contracts through interest arbitration, to
the current practice of final resolution of contract grievances. Id. at 1247-48
(citing WITTE, HISTORICAL SURVEY OF LABOR ARBITRATION 3 (1952)).
236. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960). The Court recognized that different policy considerations ap-
ply to labor arbitration cases than apply to commercial arbitration cases, stating
that:
In the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation. Here
arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife. Since arbitration of la-
bor disputes has quite different functions from arbitration under an or-
dinary commercial agreement, the hostility evinced by courts toward
arbitration of commercial agreements has no place here. For arbitra-
tion of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part
and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.
Id. at 578. Warrior & Gulf is one of the Steelworkers Trilogy cases. For a further
discussion of Warrior & Gulf, see supra notes 4 & 11.
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scheme. Labor disputes reach arbitration only after being
processed through the numerous steps of the grievance proce-
dure.23 7 Most are settled. Thus, the possibility of final and bind-
ing arbitration serves initially as an incentive to the parties to
resolve the dispute before resorting to arbitration. If arbitration
is seen only as a preliminary step to court resolution, the process
of negotiation and settlement is extended and harmed.
When seen as part of the grievance resolution process, arbi-
tration can assume its proper role: the final stage. If court review
of a "final and binding" decision can be too easily obtained, such
review can cause mistrust because one party is reneging on its
promise that the award will be final; review may, therefore, inter-
fere with other parts of the bargaining relationship. For example,
court review might prevent the parties from solving at the bar-
gaining table any problems possibly caused by an award. While
the ruling of the arbitrator under a collective bargaining agree-
ment is to be final as to the dispute before him or her, the parties
are free to bargain changes into the next agreement to correct or
modify what either party might view as a "wrong" result. This is
part of the clarification and evolution of the labor contract.
If the parties are falsely encouraged to seek court review, this
healthy bargaining process is delayed. Instead, the parties must
live with uncertainty over the meaning of the contract until their
disagreement is resolved in court. Given the delays in our judicial
system, this is a genuine risk. Even where the courts of appeals
ultimately use discretion and limit the reaches of judicial review,
the harm has already been done. 238 The party seeking review has
237. Summers,Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through the Looking
Glass, 2 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 2 (1953).
238. See, e.g., General Telephone Co. v. Communications Workers, 648
F.2d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 1981). This case involved an employee's grievance
under a union contract. The employee's reporting center was moved and the
employee requested the employer company to pay his moving cost. Id. at 453.
The employee relied on a provision in the union contract that "[c]osts of moving
to new work locations will be assumed by the Company." Id. The company
refused to pay, claiming that only the employee's reporting center and not his
work location had changed, and in the alternative, that the employee's failure to
move constituted a waiver of his right to moving expenses. Id. The arbitrator,
in an initial and subsequent clarifying award, granted the employee the costs of
moving and the total daily mileage expenses he had incurred in the time since
the company had refused to pay the moving cost. Id. at 455. The district court
approved the award of moving expenses but found the daily mileage award to
exceed the arbitrator's authority. Id.
The Sixth Circuit first noted the "extremely narrow role" of courts in re-
viewing an arbitrator's award. Id. at 456. The court went on to hold that the
"district court erred by substituting its judgment on the merits for that of the
1987]
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been encouraged to seek review by the words of the statute and
the district court may have already applied the Act to reverse the
award. By the time the court of appeals overturns the lower
court's ruling, substantial time has elapsed and the bargaining re-
lationship of the parties has been damaged.
Further, national labor policy requires that the awards of la-
bor arbitrators not be subject to a gauntlet of rules designed to
open them to judicial scrutiny and possible reversal because the
application of such rules takes time. Judicial review is not quick
and rules which may encourage the parties to seek review add to
the delays. As Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit recently
noted: "The most important reason for deference to labor arbi-
trators is that labor disputes ought to be resolved rapidly; and, to
be fast, arbitration must be final." 239 Rather, review of labor arbi-
tration awards must be done in an atmosphere sensitive to both
the differences between commercial and labor arbitration and the
importance of finality in the labor arbitration process.
In addition to being inconsistent with present policy, applica-
tion of the Act to labor arbitration is inconsistent with the ideal
model of labor policy in the future. Numerous distinguished
commentators have written, for example, on the need for narrow-
ing the scope of court review of labor arbitration awards.240
While their proposals differ in some regards, all suggest a model
arbitrator." Id. at 457. The appellate court then remanded with instructions to
the district court to enter judgment enforcing the entire arbitral award. Id.
239. Jones Dairy Farm v. UFCW Local P-1236, 755 F.2d 583, 586 (7th Cir.
1985) (Posner, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court has recognized this need for finality in labor arbitration
in the related area of fair representation suits. See, e.g., United Parcel Service,
Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981). In United Parcel, a suit against the employer
and union by an employee claiming that the union had violated its duty of fair
representation and that the employer had violated the collective bargaining
agreement, the Court reversed a lower court ruling that a six year statute of
limitations applied. Id. As the Court stated:
This system, with its heavy emphasis on grievance, arbitration, and the
"law of the shop," could easily become unworkable if a decision which
has given "meaning and content" to the terms of an agreement, and
even affected subsequent modifications of the agreement, could sud-
denly be called into question as much as six years later.
Id. at 64.
Congress, too, has declared the desirability of "[final adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties ...for settlement of grievance disputes
arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining
agreement." 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982) (emphasis added).
240. See Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, in PROC. OF THE
29TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, 97,107 (B. Dennis
& G. Somers eds. 1976) (deference to arbitral awards is result of "recognition
that arbitration is not a substitute for judicial adjudication, but a part of a system
[Vol. 32: p. 57
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for court review that differs from the formal checklist approach of
the Arbitration Act. 24 1
Professor St. Antoine presents the concept of the arbitrator
as "contract reader." 242 As "contract reader," the arbitrator acts
for the parties when he or she strikes "whatever supplementary
bargain is necessary to handle the anticipated unanticipated omis-
of industrial self-governance"); Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the
Scope of Judicial Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 297-98 (1980).
The author stated:
It is hoped that judges will learn to temper their activist instincts with
an appreciation that the agreement before them is a unique type of con-
tract, and that an apparently erroneous award may in fact just reflect
the creative search for special rules that the parties need from their
private judge, and for which they have negotiated.
Id.; see also St. Antoine,Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at
Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1160-61 (1977) (arbitrator
is "reader" of parties' contract, his award becomes part of their contract, and
therefore courts defer to arbitrator whose award should stand absent procedural
violations or illegality of resulting contract); Summers, supra note 237, at 27
(considering role of courts in reviewing merits of grievance, author finds that
"courts have a function, but it is the limited one of exercising only enough su-
pervision to prevent labor arbitration from destroying itself").
Courts do at times directly review the merits of labor arbitrators' awards.
Perhaps the most famous case of this nature is a Second Circuit decision. See
Torrington Co. v. Metal Prod. Workers, Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966)
(overturning arbitrator's award of time off for election despite arbitrator's reli-
ance on past practice, conduct of negotiations and the agreement reached at
bargaining table, finding that arbitrator exceeded his authority in finding im-
plied provision).
A more recent case exemplifies the conduct of a district judge placing him-
self in the role of a labor arbitrator. See DuPont v. Grasselli Employees Ass'n,
790 F.2d 611 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 186 (1986). In this case, an em-
ployee was discharged for assaulting fellow employees and destroying company
property. 790 F.2d at 613. An arbitrator determined that the employee had had
a mental breakdown, had not misused drugs, and was not likely to have a similar
breakdown in the future. Id. Finding that the employee lacked fault with respect
to his transgressions, the arbitrator held that the company had discharged him
without just cause. Id. On the basis of this finding, and of the employer com-
pany's failure to conduct a full investigation before the discharge, as was re-
quired by company policy, the arbitrator ordered the employee reinstated. Id.
The district court denied a motion to enforce the arbitrator's award on the
basis that the arbitration had failed to sufficiently consider the extent of violence
and that procedural irregularities were not relevant. Id. The Seventh Circuit
reversed, stating that "[w]hile this Court does not necessarily agree with the
arbitrator's conceptions of just cause, mere disagreement does not allow an
overturning of the award." Id. at 615. The court thus recognized the standard
of limited judicial review of the arbitrator's award, and finding no sufficient
grounds for nonenforcement, made its order accordingly. Id.
241. Compare St. Antoine, supra note 240, at 1146 (advocating that awards
not be reversed for "gross error" because award of contract reader is parties'
stipulated adopted remedy) with Kaden, supra note 240, at 297 (arguing that
judges could reverse "outrageous" awards or awards disclosing clear error such
as wrongful assumption of a crucial fact).
242. St. Antoine, supra note 240, at 1138.
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sions of the initial agreement. '243 Under this view, there can be
no "misinterpretation" because the award is the contract of the
parties. Professor St. Antoine notes also that parties to a contract
not containing an arbitration clause do not usually agree that a
trial court's interpretation shall be "final and binding" as is gen-
erally agreed in an arbitration clause. 244 Thus, an arbitrator's
award should be entitled to more deference than that of a district
court.
Professor Kaden argues that the source of deference to an
arbitrator's judgment is not his or her expertise but rather the
fact that "it is the arbitrator's assignment to read the parties'
agreement against the backdrop of ongoing practices and habits
in the plant, with the understanding that his reading will become
part of the agreement itself."245 Similarly, Professor Feller has
suggested that the deference accorded to arbitral awards under
collective bargaining agreements is due to a distinction between
arbitration as rule-making and adjudication as rule-application. 246
Commercial arbitration, for which the statute was designed, more
closely resembles adjudication in this regard.
None of these formulations can be safely accommodated
within the framework of an arbitration act designed for commer-
cial arbitration. Rather, they can become law only through modi-
fication and evolution of the Enterprise Wheel standard of review. 247
Perhaps the necessity of judicial restraint was best stated by Pro-
fessor Summers who argued that what is needed is "an attitude of
tolerance and humility, not a mathematical formula." 248 The
checklist approach of the United States Arbitration Act 249 looks
too much like such a formula to satisfy the objectives of national
labor policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is little, if any, justification for continued federal court
243. Id. at 1140.
244. Id. at 1141.
245. Kaden, supra note 240, at 295-96.
246. Feller, supra note 240, at 97-101; see also Feller, A General Theory of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663, 750 (1973) ("There is little
doubt that orders directing. . . remedial action are what the parties intend the
arbitrators to issue, and arbitrators will grant this kind of relief, usually without
question, whether or not there is specific language in the agreement authorizing
it.").
247. For a discussion of the Enterprise Wheel standard, see supra note 2.
248. Summers, supra note 237 at 24.
249. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
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application of the United States Arbitration Act to review the
awards of labor arbitrators operating under collective bargaining
agreements. Through the statute, Congress in 1924 sought to
make enforceable commercial arbitration agreements. Labor ar-
bitration, which was not prevalent at the time, was not within
Congress' purview. Further, in response to potential labor oppo-
sition, the Act was amended to exclude contracts of employment,
a term which, based on Congress' intent and the common mean-
ing of the words, should be interpreted to cover collective bar-
gaining agreements.
Even were the statute and its legislative history more ambigu-
ous, the national labor policy favoring speed and finality in labor
arbitration favors a broad reading of the exclusion for contracts
of employment. The Act, designed for commercial arbitration
and not for labor arbitration, provides an all too inviting avenue
for dissatisfied parties to continue a dispute via litigation.
For these reasons, it is suggested that the courts of appeals
reevaluate their positions on this issue and follow the lead of the
Fourth Circuit in holding the Act inapplicable to labor arbitra-
tion. If this is not done, the Supreme Court may have to provide
final resolution to the question left unanswered in Lincoln Mills.
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